Problem
A Pay-to-Taproot (P2TR) output's scriptPubKey is OP_1 <32-byte x-only key>. That key is the
output key Q = P + t·G, a point on secp256k1 published in full. A quantum attacker running
Shor's algorithm computes the discrete log of Q directly and produces a valid key-path
signature. Whether the output was built with a script tree, and whatever that tree contains, is
irrelevant: key-path spending only requires a signature for Q.
This is the same exposure class as Proposal 015's P2PK outputs — the key is visible from the moment the output is created, before any spend.
Detection
// 5120 || x (32 bytes)
const m = /^5120([0-9a-f]{64})$/.exec(hex);
if (m && isXOnlyOnCurve(m[1])) return '019';
isXOnlyOnCurve checks that x³ + 7 is a quadratic residue mod p (BIP-340 lifts the even-y
point). Off-curve x values are already Proposal 007 (provably lost) and are not tagged here.
Classification
Loss bucket: 4 (Quantum only). Not a loss under classical assumptions.
The 32-byte x-only key is stored as the output's pubkey_hex; the address's exposure_kind
is p2tr.
Interaction with other rules
- 007 (off-curve x): takes precedence, bucket 1, never tagged 019.
- 018 (NUMS output key): tagged both 018 and 019; the bucket ladder places it in bucket 2 (probably lost). As 018 notes, a NUMS output key is still quantum-recoverable, and the exposed flag is set, so the quantum lens includes it.
Relationship to Proposal 015
Identical mechanism — key in the output script — for the newest output type rather than the oldest. Together with Proposal 020 (bare multisig) these three rules define "exposed from creation"; Proposals 016 and 021 define "exposed from first spend".