Problem
A bare multisig (P2MS) output is OP_M <key>…<key> OP_N OP_CHECKMULTISIG with every cosigner
key written into the scriptPubKey. A quantum attacker derives the private key for any M of
the N on-curve keys and spends the output. Like P2PK and P2TR, exposure is static: the keys are
public from creation.
Detection
Parse the standard template (the same parser Proposal 006 uses). Tag when at least M of the N keys are valid curve points:
const ms = parseMultisigScript(hex);
if (ms && ms.pubkeys.filter(isValidPubkey).length >= ms.m) return '020';
Scripts with fewer than M valid keys cannot be spent by anyone and are Proposal 006
(provably lost). Non-template scripts ending in OP_CHECKMULTISIG are not tagged.
Classification
Loss bucket: 4 (Quantum only). The on-curve keys are stored comma-joined in pubkey_hex.
Bare multisig outputs carry no address, so they appear in the quantum lens per output, as P2PK
outputs do.
Notes
Most bare multisig outputs were created in 2013–2014 as a data-embedding workaround; many carry deliberately invalid keys (006) and most of the rest are dust. The scale is small, but the rule closes the set of key-in-script output types so the quantum total has no known omissions.